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Abstract

This paper applies the demand-an d-supply approach to the process of
institutio nal change. Both the induced, voluntary change and the imposed,
governme nt-institu ted change are discussed . The induced institutio nal
change is a response to the profitabl e opportun ities that arise from
institutio nal disequilib rium. The sources of institutio nal disequilib rium
are identifie d in this paper. Since an institutio nal arrangeme nt is a
public good, the supply of new institutio nal arrangeme nts by the induced
process will be less than the social optimum. To rectify the undersupp ly,
governmen t initiativ es are often required. However, for the reasons that
are discussed under the title of policy failures, the governmen t may not
have incentive s to take such action.
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I. Introduction
This article draws on recent progress in economics, especially in
the economics of information, property rights, transaction costs, induced
innovations, household production, and the theory of the state, to
analyze the functions and choices of social institutions, and the
mechanism of institutional change. My purpose is to show that
institutions provide useful services and that their choices and changes
can be analyzed under the demand and supply framework. Special attention
will be given to the role of the state in the process of institutional
change in an economy.
The study of the institution and its evolution is one of the focuses
of Marxist economists. In contrast, the conventional neoclassical
economics takes the existing institutions of the modern Western economies
for granted (Sweezy, 1970). In the construction of economic models, well
defined property rights, perfect information, and frictionless
transactions are in general implicitly assumed.

With some additional

assumptions about the characteristics of production and utility functions
which are termed as the "classical environment, 111 the two well-known
optimality theorems on welfare economics are then shown to be attainable
in the market economy: first, the resource allocation is Pareto-optimal,
if there is perfect competition; second, any specified Pareto-optimal
resource allocation that is technically feasible can be achieved by
establishing free markets and an appropriate patten of factor ownership.
A firm in this context is reduced to a synonym of a production function
1

(Williams on, 1980). Alternati ve institutio nal arrangeme nts are irrelevan t
because the market performs the function of resource allocatio n more
efficient ly. Governmen t intervent ions are warranted only when market
failures occur due to the violation of the "classica l" environme nt.
Neverthe less, different institutio ns exist side by side with the
markets even in the most advanced economies . Large, modern hierarchi cal
business enterpris es compete with the markets as alternati ve institutio ns
in coordinat ing productio n and allocatin g resources . It is noted that the
innovatio n of the modern hierarchi cal business enterpris e was one of the
2
major sources of economic growth in the United States, and this
innovatio n cannot simply be attribute d to the desire for extending
monopoly power (Williams on, 1975). The governmen t is also far from the
"minimal state," which is limited to the functions of providing law and
order, and protectin g property rights. Different institutio ns are
competing in the institutio nal market. As noted by Schultz (1968, p.
1114), "it is obvious that particula r institutio ns really matter, that
they are subject to change and are, in fact, changing, and that people
are trying to clarify social choices with regard to alternati ve
institutio nal change to improve the economic efficienc y and the welfare
performan ce of the economy. 113 Taking the existing market institutio ns as
given criticall y limits the applicab ility of the conventio nal economics
in coping with a varieties of economic issues.
The assumptio ns of frictionl ess transacti ons, perfect informati on,
and well-defi ned property rights are particula rly inadequat e in dealing
with many economic problems in underdeve loped areas where factor and
output markets are imperfect and in understan ding the evolution of
2

history. In the past several years, a number of economist s have attempted
to extend the neoclassi cal framework in order to endogeniz e the
institutio n. Attention s have been increasin gly given to the role of costs
of informati on and transactio ns in determini ng efficient institutio ns in
market economies (Arrow, 1974; Williamso n, 1975, 1985), in primitive
societies (Posner, 1980), and in rural economies (Binswang er and
Rosenzwe ig, 1986). The same analytica l framework has also been extended
to explain the change of institutio n over time (Schultz, 1968; Davis and
North, 1970; North and Thomas, 1970; North, 1981; Hayami and Ruttan,
1971; Binswange r and Ruttan, 1978; Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981). This paper
attempts to make a contribut ion to this growing literatur e.
My basic thesis is as follows: individua ls in any society, primitive
and capitalis t alike, face uncertain ty and the possibili ty of disasters ,
in addition to the life cycle of their working abilities . They hope to
survive and to achieve a high level of satisfact ion. Institutio ns can be
defined as the behavior rules that are observed by the individua ls of a
society. They are human devices designed to cope with uncertain ty and to
increase individua l utility. Institutio ns, be they market or nonmarke t,
provide useful services in this regard.

As any other kind of service,

institutio nal services are obtained with certain costs. Given technolog y,
transacti on costs are the core in the choice of competiti ve institutio nal
arrangeme nts in a society. The institutio nal arrangeme nt with the least
costs in providing a given amount of service will be desirable . The
change from an existing institutio nal arrangeme nt to another alternati ve
is a costly process; unless the net gains to individua ls from changing to
the new arrangeme nt outweigh the costs of the change, a voluntary
3

institutional change will not occur. Institutional changes often require
collective action. Free riders are thus an innate issue in institutional
change. Furthermore, an institution arrangement once innovated becomes a
public good. Therefore, the supply of new institutional arrangements by
the voluntary process will be less than the optimal supply. Institutional
arrangement are interrelated in a society. The efficiency of a particular
institutional arrangement cannot be assessed without referring to the
other related institutional arrangements in that society. Therefore, an
institutional arrangement which is efficient in one society may not be
efficient in other societies. Among all the institutional arrangements in
a society, the government is the most important one. The government can
take actions to rectify the under-supply of institutions. However, a
theory of the state is required to understand if the government has
incentives to do so.

The state will institute a new institution only to

the extent that the benefits to the state are higher than the costs. The
failure of the state to institute the most efficient arrangements has
several sources. They can occur because of ideological reasons, group
interest conflicts, or the limitation of social science knowledge, and so
on. Economic growth will render some existing institutional arrangements
obsolete due to the shifts in the demand or supply of institutional
services. New institutional arrangements will thus be innovated to
capture the profitable opportunities accompanying the economic growth.
Institutional change is thus inevitable in the process of development.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II explains why the
world of Robinson Crusoe is only a fiction. The behavioral assumptions
and the environment that individuals face are explicitly postulated. The
4

determinant s of institution al arrangement s in a society are also
specified. Section III applies the demand and supply framework to analyze
induced institution al change. The sources of institution al disequilibr ia
are identified and the dynamics of induced changes are discussed. In
Section IV, a theory of the state is presented. Emphasis will be placed
on explaining why government often fails to institute efficient
institution al arrangement s. In Section III and IV, induced and imposed
institution al changes are distinguish ed. Whereas induced institution al
change refers to the voluntary change by a group of individuals in
response to profitable opportuniti es arising from institution al
disequilibr ia, imposed change refers to change that is introduced by
government fiat. Although a voluntary change in the institution often
requires government action to facilitate the process, I separate these
two types of changes for convenience of analysis. Some concluding remarks
are presented in Section V.
II. The Functions of Institution
In the most general sense, an institution can be perceived as a set
4
of behavioral rules that is observed by individuals in a society. It is
unfortunate that one of the most often told stories in the economic
textbooks is that of Robinson Crusoe. Although this story illustrates the
choices and constraints facing every decision maker, to start the inquiry
into economic behavior with this story is actually misleading. In
Crusoe's world no institution is needed, but from the very beginning of
their history human beings have always lived in a society and have had to
interact with each other. It is also a traditional view to say that human
beings are "social animals" or that men have an "instinct" to join in a
5

group. 5 Neither do these statement s increase our knowledge about
institutio ns. Institutio ns are not needed because human beings have to
live in groups, rather it is "the propensit y to truck, barter, and
exchange one thing for another" (Smith, 1937, p.13) that makes
institutio ns indispens able. If "two or more persons exchange goods with
each other, then the result for each one will depend in general not
merely upon his own actions but on those of the others as well" (von
Neumann and Morgenste rn, 1953, p. 11); therefore , to make exchanges
possible, behaviora l rules that govern the way in which individua ls can
cooperate and compete are required. I shall investiga te below the
functions and the determina nts of institutio ns; but first it is essential
to specify the individua l behaviora l and environm ental characte ristics
that lead to the existence of institutio ns.
The Need for Institutio ns
The reasons why institutio ns are indispens able for human beings need
to be explained in terms of both the limitatio n of human ability and the
environme nt in which human beings live.
One of the most robust assumptio ns in economics is that "men are
rational. " By rationali ty, economist s mean that individua ls, when
confronte d with real choices in exchange, will choose "more" rather than
"less. 116

This approach to human behavior, according to Becker,

distingui shes economics from other social sciences (Becker, 1976, chap.
1). Actually, most advances in economics in recent decades can be
attribute d to the reinterpr etation and integratio n into the rational
framework of those kinds of behavior that used to be taken as
"nonratio nal" and thus were outside the purview of economic inquiry. This
6

reinterpretatio n has been achieved by taking into account the costs of
information, enforcement, and so forth. Following Becker's approach, I
assume that individuals have stable preferences "that are defined over
fundamental aspects of life, such as health, prestige, sensual pleasure,
benevolence, or envy," which are denoted as commodities (Becker, 1976, p.
5).7 An individual use purchased goods as well as his own time to produce
these commodities to maximize his own preference. Therefore, an
individual is not solely concerned with material gains or money income.
Pursuing health, prestige, pleasure, and other nonmaterial commodities
may induce individuals to forgo the maximum material gains that are
available to him. 8 An individual is not necessarily selfish; however, he
will be altruistic only to the extent that the returns to his altruism
exceed the costs of being an altruist. 9 Rationality does not mean an
individual will not make mistakes. A rational man, nevertheless, will
cease to do the same mistake if he discovers it and the costs to
eliminate the mistake is smaller than the benefits therefrom (Downs,
1957, p. 9). Although an individual is rational, his rationality is
limited by his neurophysical ability to receive, store, retrieve, and
process information and by his language ability to make knowledge or
feelings understood by others (Williamson, 1975, chap. 2). Because of
bounded rationality, global maximization of individual preference will
not be guaranteed in a complex environment. The other reason for the
failure to achieve global maximization is that information is costly. It
takes time, effort, and sometimes money to obtain data and comprehend
their meaning. Therefore, it is rational not to have perfect information
if the expected gains from additional information are higher than the
7

costs of obtaining this additional information .
Bounded rationality alone is not a sufficient condition for the
indispensa bility of institution s. Robinson Crusoe is also rational in
making his decisions about production and consumption . The cycle of
individual life, uncertainti es from health and the production process,
and disasters from nature, on the one hand, and the gains from
technologic al economies of scale, and externality , on the other hand, are
also necessary conditions for the existence of institution s. Because of
the life cycle and exposure to uncertainty and because human beings are
"limited in knowledge, foresight, skill, and time" (Simon, 1957, p.199),
men need institution s to facilitate cooperation with others, to make
provisions for security when they are young and old, to even out income
and consumption over time, and to insure against the consequence of risks
and disasters. I will refer to these functions as security functions. The
other reason for the existence of institution s is the gains from
economies of scale and externality . An individual as a unit of production
is too small to internalize much of these economies. To exploit these
gains, collective actions are required. These functions will be referred
to as economy functions. It is for security reasons and economy reasons
that men need to exchange goods and services with each other and make
behavior rules indispensab le.
An Economic Inguiry into Institution s
Before going into any further investigatio n, the distinction s
between two related concepts concerning institution s are in order.
An institution al arran~ement is defined as a set of behavioral rules
that governs a specific pattern of action and relationshi ps. An
8

institutional arrangement can be formal or informal. Examples of formal
institutional arrangements are families, firms, labor unions, hospitals,
universities, governments, money, future markets, and so on. In contrast,
values, ideologies, and customs are just a few examples of informal
institutional arrangements. 10 When the term "institution" is used by
economists, they are generally referring to an institutional arrangement.
A second concept is the institutional structure, which is defined as the
totality of institutional arrangements, both formal and informal, in a
society. 11 As will become clear in the next section, an institutional
change, in most cases, only refers to the change of a particular
institutional arrangement with other arrangements in the structure
unchanged, not to the change of every arrangement in the whole structure.
Failure to distinguish between these two concepts has caused some
controversy in the literature about the possibility of endogenizing the
institutional change (Field, 1981).
Security and economy are the two fundamental reasons for the
existence of institutional arrangements and thus the institutional
structure. Examples of institutional arrangements for the purpose of
security are families, cooperatives, insurance, and social security
programs. Institutional arrangements that perform the economy function
are firms, irrigation systems, highways, schools, agricultural experiment
stations, to name just a few. It is worthwhile to notice that an
institutional arrangement, like a family and a cooperative, may at the
same time perform several functions.
Institutional arrangements are means of achieving the benefits of
collective actions. Since individual rationality does not necessarily
9

imply group rationality, it is in the interest of each individual to seek
the most favorable result for himself. Conflicts of interest may arise.
Individuals often have to assess the quality of other people's work or
contributions. Information about quality is in many circumstances very
costly, uncertain, or even impossible to obtain. Collective actions thus
create some problems that do not exist when individuals work alone. Among
these problems are cheating, shirking, free riders, 12 and moral
hazards. 13 These issues are emphasized by the property-rights economists,
transaction-costs economists, and public-choice economists (see Olson,
1965; Demsetz, 1967; Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; Furubotn and Pejovich,
1972; and Williamson, 1975, 1985). To alleviate these problems, some
institutional arrangements are created to perform the functions of
monitoring, enforcement, and so forth. Hierarchies, contracts, and laws
are institutional arrangements in this regard. The problems of shirking,
free riders, and moral hazards also increase the costs of supplying the
service of fundamental institutional arrangements. There will also be
some institutional arrangements that aim to reduce the costs of supplying
the services of fundamental institutional arrangements. Private property
rights, money, contracts, customs, ethics, mores, and ideologies are a
few examples. 14 The existence of private rights, legal system, money, and
so on presumes the existence of a state. The discussion of institutions
is not complete without a theory of the state. However, I will suspend
the investigation of the state until Section IV.
The most important institutional arrangement that exists to reduce
the costs of providing the services of other institutional arrangements
is ideology. Ideology has long been a subject of concern for Marxian
10

economists. Perhaps because of this, it has not received much attention
15
from the mainstream economists until very recently.

However, as noted

by Arrow (1974, p. 72), "Employees follow instruction s, and citizens obey
law to a much greater extent than can be explained on the basis of
control mechanisms. " To close this gap, a positive theory of ideology is
required.
Ideology can be defined as a set of beliefs about the world that
tend to judge morally the division of labor, income distributio n, and the
existing institution al structure of a society. As North

succinctly

summarizes, ideologies have three stylized features:
1. Ideology is an economizing device by which individuals
come to terms with their environment and are provided with a
"world view" so that the decision-ma king process is simplified.
2. Ideology is inextricabl y interwoven with moral and
ethical judgments about the fairness of the world the
individual perceives ....
3. Individuals alter their ideological perspective s when
their experiences are inconsisten t with their ideology. In
effect, they attempt to develop a new set of rationaliza tions
that are a better "fit" with their experiences . However, it is
important to stress ... inconsisten cies between experience and
ideologies must accumulate before individuals alter their
ideology (North, 1981, p. 49).
Ideology is mentioned in the literature mostly for its function in
legitimatin g the existing institution al structure or solidifying a group.
It is true that a society or group can not exist for long if the majority
of its members do not share the same feeling about the justice of the
system. And in a society if the differences in ideology between different
classes are deep enough, revolution will follow. A society or an
organizatio n is formed to exploit the gains that an individual is unable
11

to capture; however, the rationality assumption of individual behavior
also implies that any large organization is inherently beset by free
rider problems (Olson, 1965). A successful ideology must thus also
overcome the free-rider problem. Since an ideology is an economizing
device for the recognition of the world, for an ideology to be effective,
it must conform reasonably well with an individual's experience of the
world. As the world changes and individuals' experiences accumulate,
their perceptions of a fair world also change. A successful ideology must
also be flexible enough to capture the loyalty of new groups and retain
the loyalty of older groups (North, 1981, chap. 5).
Ideologies exist because the world is complex, and the rationality
of a human's mind is bounded. If the world were simple or an individual's
rationality were unbounded, an individual would judge the fairness of the
reality around him without taking a short-cut in the form of an ideology.
An ideology's primary function is thus serving as a device for
economizing information costs. But by what mechanism does an ideology
perform the functions of checking free riders and reducing the costs of
enforcing law and order? I submit that a successful ideology performs
16 As
these functions by providing selective incentives to individuals.
argued forcefully by Becker, individuals use market goods and services,
their own time, human capital, and other inputs to produce a set of
commodities that are defined over fundamental aspects of life in order to
maximize their preferences. Piety, which Jeremy Bentham maintained as one
of the fifteen simple pressures, should be one of the commodities that
enters an individual's preference function. The ability to produce this
piety commodity, among others, depends on an individual's ideological

12

capital. When an individual's ideological conviction is strong, it
implies that his ideological capital is large, and then the shadow price
of producing piety is low. His marginal utility of time allocated to
piety is high; therefore, he allocate more time to the consumption of
piety. Olson (1965) is right in pointing out that for any large
organization to be viable, it should be able to provide selective
incentives to its members. But Olson defines the arguments in the utility
function narrowly, therefore, he cannot explain why most people vote.
North notes that many people vote for ideological reasons, but he fails
to recognize that voting is an activity that produces a commodity that an
individual consumes. An individual will vote because voting produces a
piety commodity that he values. However, he will vote only if the
benefits are larger than the costs. This is the reason why the number of
voter falls greatly if it rains.
An ideology is human capital that helps an individual make a moral
judgement about his and others' roles in the division of labor, the
distribution of income, and the existing institutional structure. This
human-capital theory of ideology has the following implications. (A) A
larger ideological endowment reduces the shadow price of consuming piety.
Therefore, an individual is less likely to free ride or violate the
rules, the higher his ideological conviction about the morality of the
institutional arrangements and the structure surrounding him. (B) An
individual's ideology is relatively stable. A change in the distribution
of income, the division of labor, or other institutional arrangements
will not change an individual's ideology immediately.

This is because an

individual cannot tell immediately this change is a temporary or a
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permanent one. If this change is permanent, it will take time for the
individual to divest the old ideological capital. (c) If a permanent
change occurs, young people are more ready to invest in acquiring a new
ideology than old people, even if they have the same preference, for the
following two reasons. First, old people in general have more ideological
capital to divest. It takes time and effort to do so. Second, they have
less incentives to invest because the years remaining to collect the
returns are relatively few. (D) Opportunist ic behavior is attenuated by
the ideological conviction of the legitimacy of the existing
institution al arrangement s. An ideology is thus human capital that
produces great externality from the authority's point of view; therefore,
any government will subsidize the individual' s accumulatio n of
ideological capital by investing in ideological education. However,
resembling advertizeme nt (Stigler and Becker, 1977), it affect people's
17
behavior not by changing tastes, but by changing the relative prices.
III. An Economic Approach to Induced Institution al Change
For any desired institution al service, there are always a number of
institution al arrangement s that can perform this function. The choice of
an institution al arrangement thus involves the calculus of costs and
benefits. In the conventiona l cost-benefi t analysis, only the production
costs are taken into account. Optimality is obtained when the values of
marginal products of each input are equalized. The costs in the choice of
an institution al arrangement , nevertheles s, also include the costs of
organizing, maintaining , and enforcing the rules of this particular
arrangement . The second category of costs is referred to as transaction
costs. In addition to technical factors, the transaction costs of an

14

institutional arrangement also depend on the perceived legitimacy of this
arrangement, which we have mentioned in the discussion of ideologies.
Theoretically, it is easy to say, abstracted from the role of the state,
that with given production and transaction costs, one institutional
arrangement is more efficient than another, if it provides more services.
Alternatively, for two institutional arrangements that provide the same
amount of service, the one with lower costs is a more efficient
arrangement. Therefore, there are two different types of factors that can
affect the efficiency of an institutional arrangement. The first type
affects production efficiency. The other type involves those factors that
determine the transaction efficiency. Fundamentally, these two types of
factors are all functions of technology. However, assessing the
efficiency of an institutional arrangement is extremely complicated in
reality. Since an institutional arrangement is embedded in the
institutional structure, its efficiency also depends on how well the
18 For example,
other institutional arrangements perform their functions.
in a barter system there is great inconvenience and cost in searching for
someone who has what you want and wants what you have. This inconvenience
alone, nevertheless, does not indicate that it is necessarily
inefficient. Since the costs of having an agreed-on commodity serve as a
generally acceptable means of exchange or of establishing and maintaining
a monetary authority are very high, a barter system can be more efficient
than a money-exchange system if people rarely exchange goods. This is the
situation in a primitive society. It is, therefore, fruitless to single
out a particular institutional arrangement and to discuss its efficiency
in absolute terms. The study of an institutional arrangement requires

15

specific knowledge of the historic time, region, and the institutional
structure that this arrangement situates. In the absence of such
understanding, a discussion of the efficiency of a particular
institutional arrangement is without substance. 19 As we will find, the
direction and scope of institutional change are not random: they can be
subject to rigorous economic analysis. A more profitable approach,
therefore, is to investigate why new institutional arrangements are
innovated and how they are adopted.
There are two types of institutional change, induced and imposed. An
induced institutional change refers to a modification or replacement of
an existing institutional arrangement or the innovation of a new
institutional arrangement that is voluntarily initiated, organized, and
executed by an individual or a group of individuals in response to
profitable opportunities. An imposed change, in contrast, is introduced
and executed by governmental orders or laws. 20 The induced institutional
change must be caused by a profitable opportunity that is not attainable
under the original institutional arrangement. The imposed institutional
change, however, can occur purely for the purpose of redistributing
existing income among different groups of constituents. Although a
voluntary change in an institutional arrangement, especially a formal
arrangement, often requires governmental action to facilitate the
process, I separate these two types of change for the convenience of
analysis. The discussion of imposed institutional changes will be
deferred until Section IV.
The Sources of Institutional Disequilibrium
An institutional arrangement will be chosen from a set of possible

16

arrangements if it is more efficient than the other arrangements in this
choice set, taking both production and transaction costs into account. As
already mentioned, the transaction costs of a particular arrangement also
depend on other arrangements, such as laws, customs, ideologies; the most
efficient institutional arrangement is a function, among other things, of
the other arrangements in the institutional structure. For an induced
institutional change to occur, there must be some profitable
opportunities that arise from institutional disequilibrium, that is, for
some reason the existing institutional arrangement is no longer the most
efficient one in the choice set.
Starting from an original equilibrium point, institutional
disequilibrium can arise from four different sources: (a) changes in the
institutional choice set, (b) changes in technology (c) changes in the
demand for institutional services, and (d) changes in the other
institutional arrangements. Each of these four sources, in turn, consists
of several different factors.
(A) Changes in the institutional choice set
Just as the set of feasible production technology is a function of
our knowledge in physics, chemistry, and other natural sciences, the set
of feasible institutional arrangements for a particular institutional
service also depends on our knowledge in the social sciences. Ruttan
(1984) has argued forcefully that the demand for knowledge in economics
and the other social sciences as well as in related professions such as
law, business, and social services is a demand derived primarily for
institutional change and improvements in institutional performance. The
advances in the social sciences improve the bounded rationality of the
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human mind and therefore not only increase individuals' ability to manage
the existing arrangements but also increase the ability to perceive and
innovate new institutional arrangements.
An institutional choice set may also be enlarged by contacts with
the other economies; just as contacts with the other economies may
increase the available technological choice set. Bauer has emphasized the
roles of individual traders in bringing new technology and institutional
arrangements and, as a result, in encouraging people to "question
existing habits and mores, and promoted the uncoerced erosion of
attitudes and customs uncongenial to material progress" (Bauer, 1984, P.
12). The possibility of institutional change through borrowing the other
society's institutional arrangement greatly decreases the costs of
investment in basic social science research. However, the institutional
transfer may be more difficult than the technological transfer, as the
efficiency of an institutional arrangement crucially depends on the
existence of other related arrangements. Schiller (1969, chap. 7)
reported a case in which the Burmese government sent some people to the
Israeli "Kibbutzim" for practical training. These trainees came to the
conclusion after a year that this extreme form of collectivism would not
be acceptable to them because it required so much public spirit and self
restraint.

More adaption is required for a transferred institutional

arrangement to perform its functions. 21
Finally, the institutional choice set can also be enlarged or
contracted by the change in government policies. For reasons that will be
discussed in the next section, the government may exclude some
institutional arrangements from the choice set. Therefore, removing a
18

restrictive government policy has the same effect as enlarging the choice
set. One recent example is the shift in the government policy in China
concerning the farming institution in rural areas. Before recent changes,
a household farming arrangement was prohibited; the only acceptable mode
was collective farming. However, because of the shift in government
policy, about 95% of households in China changed to the new household
based farming system between 1980-1983 (Lin, 1987a). On the other hand,
when the government institutes a new constraint in the institutional
choice set and this constraint is binding, institutional disequilibrium
will be a result, and originally less efficient arrangement may become a
dominant one in the restricted choice set. The emergence of subtenancy in
the Philippine villages surveyed by Hayami and Kikuchi (1981) is a result
of the restriction of rent by the land reform law.
(B) Changes in technology
I share Marx's view that the institutional structure of a society is
fundamentally conditioned by technology. In an authoritative statement
expressed in his 1859 preface to a Critique of Political Economy, Marx
writes the following:
The mode of production of material life conditions the social,
political and intellectual life process in general . . . . At a
certain stage of their development, the material productive
forces come in conflict with the existing relations of
productions, or -- what is but a legal expression for the same
thing -- with the property relations within which they have
been at work hitherto. From forms of development of the
production forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then
begins an epoch of social revolution. With the change of the
economic foundation the entire immense superstructure is more
or less rapidly transformed . . . . No social order ever perishes
before all the productive forces for which there is room in it
have developed; and new, higher relations of production never
appear before the material conditions of their existence have
matured in the womb of the old society itself. (Marx and
19

Engles, 1968, pp. 182-3).22
In addition to its determinant role on the institutional structure, the
change in technology will also alter the relative efficiencies of
particular institutional arrangements and make some other arrangements
inoperative. The impacts of technological change can be analyzed from its
effects on production and on the transaction.
On the production side, new institutional arrangements are often
required to take advantage of new potential externalities or to modify
the partitioning of new income streams among factor owners and economic
sectors. The dominance of modern firms over the traditional family
workshops in the manufacturing industry, which is a response to the size
demanded by the use of machinery in the production process, is an example
of the first case (Brewster, 1950). In the Philippines, the introduction
of modern high-yield varieties of rice and the increase in the
availability of labor have resulted in the replacement of the traditional
hunusan contract in which all villagers have the right to participate in
harvesting and receive one-sixth of the yield by the gama contract that
gives an exclusive right of harvesting for the same share to the workers
who do weeding without receiving a wage (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, chap.
5). Clearly, the innovation of the gama system is induced by the desire
to modify the new income stream between landowners and laborers.
Changes in the technology may also affect the transaction costs and
make some institutional arrangements operative that were originally
inoperative. The establishment of private property rights requires, among
other things, that the benefits for the owner that are derived from the
rights are greater than the costs of excluding others from using this
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property. When the costs are too high, the property will be commonly
owned. For example, grazing land in general is commonly owned because of
the cost of fencing. However, the innovation of low-cost barbed-wire
fencing has resulted in the private ownership and leasing of public
grazing land in the American West (Anderson and Hill, 1975). The
innovation of tractors and other farm machinery greatly reduces the cost
of supervision as it is easier to supervise one driver than a large
number of manual workers. As a result, there is a tendency to shift from
sharecroppi ng to owner operating or to change from sharecroppe rs to wage
workers (Day, 1967; Binswanger, 1978).
(C) Long-run changes in relative factor and product prices
The long-run changes in the relative prices of factors and goods are
some of the major reasons behind many of the changes in the property
rights arrangement in history. 23 The rise in the relative price of a
factor will make the ownership of that factor relatively more profitable
compared with the other factors. The rise in the price of a product will
also make the exclusive use of the factors that are used to produce this
product more attractive. The shift from the property rights in man to the
property rights in land in medieval Europe, according to North and Thomas
(1973), was a result of an increase in the population and in the scarcity
of land which increased the relative prices of land. Feeny (1982) also
finds that in Thailand the transfer from the property rights in man to
the property rights in land between the mid-ninetee nth century and the
early twentieth century can be explained by the increases in the
population and in the export demand for rice during that period. In
England the increase in the price of food made open fields and common
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pasture enclosed into private units profitable. Mccloskey (1975)
estimates that, despite the high costs of fencing, the enclosure yielded
a yearly rate of return on the order of 17 percent.
(D) Changes in other institutional arrangements
The performances of institutional arrangements in a structure are
interdependent, as argued before. A change in a particular arrangement,
therefore, may result in corresponding changes in the demand for the
services of other arrangements. As Lewis observes, "Once institutions
begin to change, they change in ways which are self-enforcing. The old
beliefs and institutions are altered, and the new beliefs and
institutions gradually become more consistent with each other and with
further change in the same direction" (Lewis, 1955, p. 146). It is argued
that sense of honor, which was such a prominent trait in primitive and
ancient societies, can be explained by the lack of a formal law
enforcement arrangement. Sense of honor increases the probability of
retaliating. It is, therefore, an important device to keep society in
order (Posner, 1980). In modern states, honor is still valued; however,
the state becomes the sole institutional arrangement that keeps society
in order. Retaliation and duels are forbidden. The existence of a
"subsistence ethic" in the preindustrializ ed society can be explained by
the low level of agricultural productivity and the limited potential size
of a market. The patron-client relationship is a transaction-co st saving
device. It substitutes for a set of specialized markets for labor, land,
credit, insurance, and so on (Hayami and Kikuchi, 1981, chap. 2). The
expansion of markets thus weakened the mutual help and patron-client
relationship (Polanyi, 1944).

Lin (1987b) finds that the rural factor
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markets were very limited in their existence before the recent change in
rural farming arrangements in China. The shift from collective farming to
the household-based farming system has resulted in the reemergence of
labor, land, and credit markets in rural China.
The Dynamics of Induced Institutional Change
Profitable opportunities will arise from the institutional
disequilibrium discussed above. New institutional arrangements will be
innovated to take advantage of these profitable opportunities. Since the
institutional structure is composed of individual arrangements, one
particular institutional arrangement in disequilibrium thus means that
the whole structure is in disequilibrium. Many institutional arrangements
are closely related. The change in one particular institutional
arrangement will also result in other related institutional arrangements
being in disequilibrium. If the rationality of the human mind is
unbounded and setting up the new institutional arrangements is costless
and timeless, then, in response to any institutional disequilibrium, the
society will instantly go from one equilibrium structure directly to
another equilibrium structure. However, the rationality of the human mind
is bounded. It is beyond the capacity of human mind to perceive all the
necessary changes and to design all the optimal arrangements at the same
time. The setting-up of a new institutional arrangement is also a time-,
effort-, and resource-consum ing process. Futhermore, individuals with
different experiences and roles in the structure will have different
perceptions of the degree and source of disequilibrium. They will also
seek different ways of partitioning the gains from the change.

For a new

set of behavior rules to be accepted and adopted, negotiation and
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agreement among individuals is required. Therefore, when disequilibrium
occurs, the process of institutional change will most likely starts from
one arrangement and spread only gradually over to the other
arrangements. 24 The processes thus take place in a historically
determined structure and are conditioned by this existing structure.
Consequently, some arrangements may be favorable from an abstract
theoretical point of view but are not viable because of incompatibility
with the other existing arrangements in the structure. 25 During the
process of an institutional change, most of the institutional
arrangements are inherited from the previous structure. Although the
fundamental properties of a structure will be altered when the
accumulation of changes in individual arrangements reaches a certain
critical point, the process of institutional change resembles an
evolutionary process (Alchian, 1950; Nelson and Winter, 1982).
Society as a whole will gain from the innovation of an institutional
arrangement that captures the profitable opportunity arising from
institutional disequilibrium. 26 Whether this innovation will take place,
however, depends on the expected gains and costs to the individual
innovators. The gains and costs to the innovators are more complicated
than the calculus of social gains and costs. These problems are different
for different types of arrangements. For the purpose of this paper,
institutional arrangements will be classified into two types, namely, a
formal institutional arrangement and an informal institutional
arrangement.
A formal institutional arrangement refers to the type of
arrangements where a change or modification of rules requires the
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sanction of the group of individuals whose behavior is governed by the
arrangement. That is, unanimity is a precondition for a voluntary change
of a formal institutional arrangement. The change in a formal
arrangement, therefore, requires that innovators take time and effort to
organize, negotiate, and obtain the consensus of the group of
individuals. The emergency of subtenancy and the shift from the
traditional hunusan contract to the gama contract in the Philippine
villages studied by Hayami and Kikuchi are just two examples of this type
of institutional change. In contrast, an informal institutional
arrangement refers to the type of arrangement where the modification or
change of rules is carried out purely by individuals without and
impossible by group action. Initially, the individual innovators will be
considered by others as violating the existing rules. The institutional
arrangement will be transformed only when the majority of the individuals
in the society abandon the original arrangement and adopt the new one.
Examples of such an institutional arrangement are values, ethic norms,
mores, customs, ideologies, and so on.
Changing a formal institutional arrangement will generally encounter
both the externality and free-rider problems. The externality problem
arises because an institutional arrangement is not patentable. When an
institutional arrangement is innovated, other groups of individuals can
imitate the innovation and dramatically reduce their costs of organizing
and devising the new arrangement. Therefore, the returns to the innovator
will be less than the returns to society as a whole. The implication of
this problem is that the intensity and frequency of innovations in the
formal institutional arrangement will be less than the optimal number for
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the society as a whole. Persistence of institutional disequilibria may
occur as a result.

The free-rider problem may arise because an

institutional arrangement is a public good. Once it is innovated and
instituted, every individual that is governed by the arrangement will
receive the same service no matter he does or does not take on the
initial trouble of this innovation. As argued before, the free-rider
problem will be attenuated by the ideological convictions of the
individuals. If the new arrangement is in conformity with their ideas of
a fair world, the premium required for them to free ride will be larger.
The severity of the free-rider problem also depends on how the group of
individuals are related. If the mobility of the members of the group is
high, free riding is more likely to happen because an individual's
behavior is less likely to be detected. The other consideration is how
tightly the group is structured. In a tightly structured community,
Hayami and Kikuchi argue that "people are less individualistic and
conform to social norms more closely" (1981, p. 36); the free-rider
problem will thus be less severe.
Because of the free-rider problem, the role of political or
institutional entrepreneurs is especially crucial in the innovation of a
formal arrangement.

A political entrepreneur is someone "who is

generally trusted (feared), or who can guess who is bluffing in the
bargaining, or who can simply save bargaining time, can sometimes work
out an arrangement that is better for all concerned than any outcome that
could emerge without entrepreneuria l leadership or organization" (Olson,
1965, p. 176). Institutional disequilibrium may affect different
individuals differently. Therefore, the success of a political
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entrepreneur depends, among other things, on his ability to design a
partitioning of the potential profits that seems to make everyone better
off and to convince the members that this partitioning is in conformity
with their own ideologies. The political entrepreneur will make an effort
to articulate the new goals and set up the new rules, if he believes the
gains are greater than the costs to him. The gains need not be material.
they can also be nonmaterial, such as those of social prestige or
political support (Eisenstadt, 1965, 1968). The costs to the entrepreneur
will be smaller if he can mobilize political support from government
agencies or ally with the local vested-interest groups. (Hayami and
Kikuchi, 1981, chap. 2). However, this consideration implies that the new
institutional arrangement may be detrimental to some individuals because,
once the coercive power is applied, the consensus is not a necessary
condition for the innovation anymore.
The problems that may arise from the innovation process involving
the informal institutional arrangements have characters very different
from the innovation of formal arrangements. Since the innovation of an
informal arrangement does not involve group action, there will be no
free-rider problems, although externality problems still exist. The
adoption of new rules completely depends on the individual calculation of
the benefits and the costs that may arise from this innovation. The costs
for the innovation also do not take the forms of time, effort, and
resources spent on the process of innovation. As the enforcement of
informal institutional arrangements depends on social interactions, the
costs to an innovator come primarily from the social pressures around
him. This cost will be extremely high if the profitable opportunity is
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not equally distributed among the members of the community. For those
people who are left behind, they may feel that the sacred mores are
offended and customary rights are stripped. Gossiping and even violence
may follow. This is the situation that often happens when a subsistence
oriented peasant economy is penetrated by the market system (Scott,
1976). For fear of social opprobrium and ostracism, an individual may be
reluctant to violate the informal arrangements, even if the material
gains from this violation appear to be very large. For this reason, the
informal institutional arrangements tend to be harder to change than the
formal arrangements. Even with governmental action the changes will not
be easy. 27
Nevertheless, the criteria and characters of the change in informal
arrangements are not altered. Values, customs, and social mores, like
ideologies, have all been changed and changing in the process of human
history. The crucial issue for the innovators is still the same as that
for other economic decision-makers. When institutional disequilibrium
gives rise to large enough expected benefits to cover the potential
costs, individuals will make the effort to adopt new values, mores, and
customs no matter how deeply rooted these rules seem to be.
The enforcement of the informal institutional arrangements mainly
depends on the social interactions. Therefore, the higher the mobility of
the members in a group or community, the less effective this enforcement
mechanism is. Hence, the higher the mobility, the easier it is for the
members to give up traditional arrangements and adopt new ones. This
explains why values and mores are, in general, in flux in a market
economy and fixed in a traditional economy. Young persons in a market
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economy will also be more likely to be innovators than old persons for
the same reasons that have been argued for ideological changes. This
phenomenon is the so-called "generation gap."
IV. The Political Economy of Imposed Institutional Change
Because an institutional arrangement is a public good and the free
rider problem is innate to the innovation process, the supply of
institutional arrangements in a society will be less than socially
optimum if the induced innovation is the only source of new institutional
arrangements. A persistent institutional undersupply can be remedied by
state interventions. Since state interventions also incur costs and
benefits to the state, whether the state has the incentive to take the
appropriate actions is a issue that can be subject to economic analysis.
This section presents an economic model of the state.

Decision making by

the state will be discussed from the point of view of a ruler. The ruler
can be a king, chief, premier, or elected president. It will be shown
that a rational ruler may fail to rectify the undersupply of
institutional arrangements for reasons that will be discussed under the
title of policy failure.
An Economic Approach to the State
The state, according to Weber's definition, is that institutional
arrangement that has a monopoly over the legitimate use of coercion in a
given area. 28 The basic functions of the state are to provide law and
order, and to protect property rights for the exchange of tax revenue.
Since there are great economies of scale in using the coercive power, the
state belongs to the category of natural monopoly. The state as a
monopolist can provide the above-mentioned services much cheaper than a
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competitive organization. Total income in the society is thus higher when
the state exists than when individuals have to provide the services
themselves or obtain them from other competitive organizations.
Normatively, it may be argued that the most desirable state is the
minimal state that is "limited to the narrow functions of protection
against force, theft, fraud, enforcement of contracts, and so on" (Nozik,
1974, p. ix). However, in reality, it is irrelevant. Being a monopolist
in the legitimate use of coercive power, the state can extend its spheres
of influence much more than those of a minimal state. Although the state
cannot determine how an institution will work, as noted by Mill, it has
"the power of deciding what institutions shall exist" (Mill, 1848, p.
21). 29 A more interesting question is whether the state has the incentive
and ability to design and impose a suitable institutional arrangement,
which the induced institutional change process fails to provide.
There are several approaches that have been proposed to study
decision making by the state. The first approach views the state as an
organic entity. The state in this view is personalized. It has its own
values, motivations, and objectives that are independent of the
individuals of which the state is composed. Becoming an integrated cell
of the state, an individual loses his own identity. The state acts to
maximize its own welfare or utility. Although this view is simple
methodologically, it does not have much substance because, as commented
by Downs (1957, p. 17), "It is based upon a mythical entity: a state
which is a thing apart from individual men." On the other extreme, the
second approach, initiated by Buchnan and Tullock (1962), conceives the
state as an instrument of achieving collective action. It is merely a set
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of processes, a machine by which individuals can satisfy some of their
wants. Individuals buy services from it and pay only the costs for the
services they receive. This view is incomplete because it neglects the
incentives of the persons who actually make decisions and run the state
apparatus. The third approach, proposed by Downs (1957) in his germane
study of the government, views decision making by the state from the
point of view of a political party, which is defined as a team of men
seeking to control the governing apparatus by legal means. The members of
a political party are assumed to agree on all their goals instead of on
just a part of them. The political party is thus viewed as a single
person with consistent preference ordering. This approach is also
unrealistic, as admitted by Downs himself: "In reality not even the key
officials of any government have exactly the same goals" (Downs, 1957,
p.26).
Since in any society the ultimate authority of the state is in the
hands of a politician who is more or less shielded from the preferences
and pressures of the citizen, a more satisfactory approach is to view
decision making by the state through behavior of the ruler of the state,
be he a king, president, prime minister, or behind-the-cur tain supreme
3
leader (Frohlich and Oppenheimer, 1974; North, 1981, chap. 3). 0 The
ruler, like any individual with bounded rationality, is concerned with
his own survival, prestige, power, wealth, position in history, and so
on. Within the constraints of possible revolt, and the threats of
potential rulers within or without. The ruler will do whatever he deems
adequate to maximize his own utility. The ruler, however, will at least
maintain a set of rules to reduce the transaction costs of ruling the
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state. These rules include those of uniform weights and measurements, and
the judicial system to settle differences. The power, prestige, and
wealth of the ruler ultimately depend on the wealth of the state;
therefore, the ruler will also provide a set of property rights that
facilitates production and trade and a set of enforcement procedures to
enforce contracts. The compliance costs of the political system depend on
the perceived legitimacy of the ruler; the ruler, therefore, will invest
in ideological education to convince constituents of the legitimacy of
his authority.
As the economy grows, institutional disequilibria emerge. Some of
the disequilibria will be removed by the induced innovations. However,
some of them will persist because of the divergence between private and
social benefits and costs. The ruler will take actions to remove the
disequilibrium if the expected profits for the ruler are higher than the
expected costs of imposing this change. An inefficient disequilibrium,
nevertheless, may also be maintained by the state if the change in the
institutional arrangement lowers the obtainable utility or threatens the
survival of the ruler. That is, the

ruler will take actions to remedy

the undersupply of institutional innovation only to the extent that the
estimated marginal benefits of imposing a new arrangement equal the
estimated marginal costs to the ruler in terms of net tax revenue,
political supports, and other commodities that enter the ruler's utility
function. There is no guarantee that the utility-maximizing ruler has the
incentives to implement policies to facilitate the supply of
institutional arrangements to the socially optimal point that maximizes
the wealth of the society as a whole.
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Being a positive study, the following subsection focuses on the
reasons that the state fails to institute the socially desirable
institutional arrangements. However, its normative implication is that
removing these sources of failures will improve the efficient supply of
imposed institutional change.
The Sources of Policy Failures
Maintaining an inefficient arrangement and the failure of the state
to take actions to remove institutional disequilibria both will be
referred to as policy failures. The policy failures have the following
origins: the preferences and bounded rationality of the ruler,
ideological rigidity, the bureaucracy,

group interest conflicts, and the

limitation of social science knowledge.
The preferences and bounded rationality of the ruler -- The
efficiency of an institutional arrangement is defined by its impact on
the total wealth of the nation. If the ruler is a wealth maximizer and
his personal wealth is proportional to the wealth of the nation, the
ruler will have incentives to institute the arrangement, within the limit
of his authority, that is most efficient. However, if the new
institutional arrangement brings higher income to the nation but lower
benefits to the ruler because of the transaction costs to the ruler, in
comparison with those of the original arrangement, the ruler may find
that it is not in his interest to institute the new arrangement.
Furthermore, wealth is only one of the many commodities that the ruler
values. If the ruler, for example, is concerned more about his prestige
in the international political arena, he may institute the arrangement
that strengthens the military power at the cost of the nation's wealth.
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From the utility-maximizing model of the ruler, we can also predict that
the ruler will be more concerned about his prestige as the wealth of the
nation increases. There are so many observations in history that an
example is unwarranted for supporting this argument. 31 Finally, even if
the ruler is a wealth maximizer, he may still fail to rectify the
undersupply of institutional arrangements due to his bounded rationality
and the complexity of information required to recognize and comprehend
the institutional disequilibria, and to design and institute a new
arrangement.
Ideological rigidity -- The transaction costs of ruling the state
are reduced if the constituents have a strong conviction toward the
legitimacy of the authority of the ruler and the fairness of the existing
institutional arrangements. Therefore, the ruler will develop an ideology
that serves his purposes and invest in education to inculcate the
constituents with this ideology. The ruler is thus personally identified
with the ideology that he promotes. As institutional disequilibrium
emerges, the gap between the ideology and reality grows. Imposing new
institutional arrangements to restore equilibrium and changing the
original ideology, however, very likely undermine the legitimacy of the
authority of the ruler. Therefore, instead of innovating new
institutional arrangements, the ruler may

maintain the old inefficient

arrangements and battle to purify the ideology for fear that his
authority may otherwise be shaken. New arrangements, hence, often become
possible only after the old ruler is replaced by a new ruler. A recent
example is the change from the collective system to the household farming
system in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaopin who is a victim
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under Mao's rule (Lin, 1987a).
The agency problem -- By definition, the ruler must have some
bureaucratic apparatus at his disposal to implement law and order,
collect taxes, inflict punishment, secure national sovereignty, and
provide other services. Each of the bureaucrats in these government
agencies is himself a rational individual. His interests never completely
coincide with the ruler's. Of cause, the ruler will attempt to monitor
the behavior of his agents, implement a reward system that promotes the
loyalty to the ruler, and inculcate an ideology that encourages honest
and unselfish commitment to one's office. However, these bureaucrats will
not be perfectly controlled, and bureaucratic discretionary behavior
cannot be completely eliminated. The result is that a policy designed to
maximize the ruler's preference will more or less be distorted to favor
the bureaucrats themselves. The ability of the ruler to maximize his own
utility and institute an efficient arrangement depends on how much the
bureaucrats take the ruler's goals as their own goals. The agency
problems exacerbate the bounded rationality of the ruler and increase the
transaction costs of ruling the state. A new institutional arrangement
will not be instituted if the additional profits from so doing will be
dissipated by bureaucratic discretionary behavior.
Group interest conflicts -- As noted by Schultz, "The individuals
who govern are politically dependent on the support of particular
population groups that make the regime viable. Economic policies are in
this context a means to maintain political support" (Schultz, 1978, p.
10). Changes in an institutional arrangement often redistribute wealth,
income, and political power between various groups of constituents. If
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the losers in the change do not receive compensation, and in most cases
they do not, they will definitely oppose

this change. Therefore, the

ruler will be reluctant to institute a change for fear of eroding his own
political support, if the losers in the institutional change are the
groups whose support the ruler relies on.

Feeny (1982, chap. 7) finds

that, in Thailand between 1880 and 1975, because the elite stood to gain
little from the technical and institutional changes, necessary actions
were not taken by the government; as a result, the development of
agriculture was retarded. A powerful group may also promote new
arrangements that redistribute income to this group, although this change
would be detrimental to the growth of the economy (Olson, 1982; Muller,
1983). Furthermore, the monopoly power of the ruler is constrained by
potential rivals, within or without the state, who will provide the same
set of services. The groups of constituents that have good access to the
rivals of the ruler will have high bargaining power. The ruler will hence
provide greater services to these groups. A change will not be instituted
if this change drives these groups of constituents to the ruler's rivals
and if the benefits that the ruler gains from the remaining constituents
cannot compensate for the harm that the ruler incurs due to the loss of
these groups of constituents (North, 1981, chap. 3).
Limitation of social science knowledge -- As argued before, the
choice set of institutional arrangements is bounded by the stock of
social science knowledge. Even if the government has the intention of
instituting an institutional arrangement to restore disequilibrium, the
government may fail to institute the correct one because of the
inadequacy of social science knowledge. Many underdeveloped countries
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adopted Soviet-type central planning in the early fifties. It is hard to
prove how much of this policy was a direct result of the prevailing
social knowledge at that time; nevertheless, as summarized by Bauer
(1984), the principal components of development literature of the early
post-war years emphasized the necessary role of comprehensive government
planning for underdeveloped countries in achieving economic growth.
Drawing on the history of the last three centuries of England and other
Western economies, Schultz (1977), nevertheless, finds that the
alteration and establishment of various distinct political-economic
institutional arrangements in a society were induced or shaped by the
dominant social thoughts in those times. The dominant social thought may
not be the "correct" one in the sense that the solution embodied in the
thought will lead to a higher income growth rate and more desirable
income distribution. Fundamentally, social thought is also limited by the
bounded rationality of the human mind. Nevertheless, it is safe to
predict that the damage will be smaller if the dominant social thought is
a result of full interaction and consultation among a wide spectrum and
various disciplines of social scientists and not a result of a handful of
authorities.
V. Concluding Remarks
In concluding this paper, some remarks about the relationship
between cultural endowments and economic growth and the role of
government on economic growth are in order.
A nation's cultural endowments, such as its values and customs, are
informal institutional arrangements. They, like formal arrangements, are
man-made devices that satisfy men's needs.
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In a stationary economy,

cultural endowments will situate in an equilibrium and often become
sacred.

However, as the economy grows, some of the original arrangements

will become obsolete because new arrangements are required to take
advantage of the opportunities that arise in providing more services or
reducing transaction costs. Although the process of institutional
innovation is plagued with externality problems, some institutional
entrepreneurs will eventually emerge, and new efficient arrangements will
be innovated, as long as the expected profits grow to outweigh the costs.
In this sense, values, customs, and other element of cultural endowments
are neutral in the process of economic growth. This does not mean that a
nation's cultural endowments do not matter, but they do not determine a
nation's future. A nation can not count on its cultural endowments for
economic growth, no matter how favorable these endowmwnts are to growth.
A nation need not to stop developing its economy until the establishment
of a set of values or mores that are congruent to growth, either. A
nation's cultural endowments will be changed, and actually they are
changing once it is profitable to do so. The hard-working attitude of
Japanese workers has been impressive and praised all over the world
today. However, a quotation from a report written in 1915 by an
Australian expert invited to visit by the Japanese government will
suffice to illustrate the above point:
My impression as to your cheap labour was soon disillusioned
when I saw your people at work. No doubt they are lowly paid,
but the return is equally so; to see your men at work made me
feel that you are a very satisfied easy-going race who reckon
time is no object. When I spoke to some managers they informed
me that it was impossible to change the habits of national
heritage (emphasis added). 3 2
The habits of national heritage, which are incompatible with an
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industrial society and are supposed to be impossible to change, have been
completely changed in just one or two generations. 33 What is the key to
the change? The key is the profits to individuals who contribute their
efforts to work and to the innovations of new attitudes, values, and
other formal and informal arrangements. No individuals are bounded by
cultural endowments in seeking to improve their own lots. They are
bounded only by the lack of opportunities that promise large enough
profits for undertaking changes.
More important for a nation's economic growth than cultural
endowments are the policies of the government. Since government provides
the framework of order on which the rest of economy is built and rational
behavior is impossible without the ordered stability that government
provides, the importance of government policy for economic growth cannot
be over-exaggerated. However, as noted by Lewis (1955, p. 376), "No
country has made economic progress without positive stimulus from
intelligent governments, . . . On the other hand, there are so many
examples of the mischief done to economic life by governments that it is
easy to fill one's pages with warnings against government participation
in economic life. 1134 So what distinguishes an intelligent government from
a non-intelligent one? The answer probably lies in how the government
guides individuals' incentives. Individuals will always seek
opportunities to benefit themselves under any circumstance. However, for
the development of an economy, it is necessary, at the risk of over
generalization, to have a system that encourages individuals to actively
seek for and innovate new profitable productive income streams and the
system also allows individuals who invest their time, effort, and money
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on these activities to reap the profits for themselves. 35 Institutional
arrangements with such a character -- or more explicitly a system of
clearly defined and well-enforced property rights in goods, factors of
production, and ideals -- are inherently public goods. They cannot be
established by the induced institutional innovation process. Without the
whole-hearted support of the government, such institutional arrangements
will not exist in a society.
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Footnotes
The financial support of the Rockefeller Foundation GA PS 8618 for
this research is gratefully acknowledged.
1 The assumptions include the absence of external economies and
diseconomies of scale, perfect divisibility of goods, convexity of the
relevant sets and functions describing preferences and technology, and
certain other mathematical features. Hurwicz (1972) calls these
assumptions as "classical environment."
2 chandler (1977) observed that technological development could only
explain half the substantial increase in railroad productivity between
1870 and 1910; the other half was due to an organizational innovation,
namely the creation of a hierarchical apparatus to monitor, evaluate, and
coordinate a complex system.
3 schultz presented his "Institutions and the Rising Economic Value
of Man" in the first Fellow Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the American
Agricultural Economics Association in 1968. Subsequently, the published
paper received an award as the outstanding article published by the
American Journal of Agricultural Economics in that year. To my knowledge,
Schultz is one of the first contemporary economists who attempts to
extend the modern analytical approach to investigate institutions and
institutional changes. In The Economic Organization of Agriculture, which
was published in 1953, he wrote, "There are alterative forms of
organization and none of these is achievable without effort, that is,
inputs are required to establish and maintain any given organization"
(pp. 249 - 50). He also commented that because of the lack of a
meaningful theory of social organization that could handle the relevant
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political and social variables, economists shied ~way from the analysis
of institutions: "As a consequence, all too frequently the statements of
economists leave the impression that markets and firms and households are
sufficient in themselves to achieve a workable economic organization" (p.
254).
4 This is the definition given by Schultz (1968) in his celebrated
paper. See also Ruttan (1978), Field (1981), and North (1981, Chap. 15).
5 see the discussion of traditional views by Olson (1965 pp. 16-22).
6A formal definition of rationality is given by Luce and Raiffa
(1957, p. 50), from the game-theoretic al prospect, as the following: "Of
two alternatives which give rise to outcomes, a player will choose the
one which yields the more preferred outcome, or more precisely, in terms
of the utility function he will attempt to maximize expected utility."
7 Becker's approach to the allocation of time, household production,
and social interactions is especially relevant for the study of
institutions and institutional change. His papers about these subjects
are collected in Becker (1976). The arguments that enter the utility
function, according to Jeremy Bentham, consist of senses, riches,
address, friendship, good reputation, power, piety, benevolence,
malevolence, knowledge, memory, imagination, hope, association, and
relief of pain (See Becker, 1976, p. 137).
8The concept that a rational individual attempts to maximize utility
not income is essential to understanding the human behavior in an economy
without perfect factor and output markets. In subsistence agriculture, a
peasant will adopt practices that maximize the security of food
production instead of maximizing the output that has the highest expected
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market value because a harvest failure may threaten his survival (Lipton,
1968).
9This rational approach to human behavior does not assume that an
individual is necessarily conscious of his efforts to maximize his
utility in a systematic pattern. This view is emphasized by Friedman
(1953), Becker (1976), and Posner (1980).
lOFamilies, firms, hospitals, universities, and so on are
institutions not because of their physical buildings but because of the
rules that organize the behavior of individuals within them (Field, 1979).
11 1 borrow the term "structure" from Montias (1976, p. 20). He says
that "the structure of the system ... consists of all the formal and
informal rules constraining the actions of the participants."

The

concept of the institutional structure is broader than the institutional
environment defined by Davis and North. The institutional environment
they defined is "a set of fundamental political, social, and legal ground
rules that govern economic and political activity (rules governing
elections, property rights, and the rights of contract are examples of
these ground rules)" (Davis and North, 1970, p. 133). However, the
institutional structure is narrower than the concept "structure" that
North uses to denote "the political and economic institutions,
technology, demography, and ideology of a society" (North, 1981).
12 Free riders" refers to the problem that occurs in a group when an
11

individual

automatically receives the service provided by the group even

if he does not contribute to the costs.

To overcome the problem, a group

needs to be able to provide selective incentives to the member in order
to maintain itself (Olson, 1965).
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13 The original meaning of "moral hazard" refers to the case in which
a person takes less than appropriate action to prevent risk when he is
insured.

In the principal-agent literature, moral hazards, however,

refers to the case in which a worker contributes less effort than that he
is paid because of asymmetrical information or imperfect monitoring.
14As Arrow notes, "Trust is an important lubricant of a social
system. It is extremely efficient; it saves a lot of trouble to have a
fair degree of reliance on other people's words . . . . Trust and similar
values, loyalty or truthtelling, ... are commodities; they have real,
practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system,
enable you to produce more goods or more of whatever values you hold in
high esteem. " (Arrow, 1974, p. 23).
15 See Downs (1957, chap. 7; 1966, chap. 19), North (1981, chap. 5),
Lodge (1986), and Lodge and Vogel (1987).
16 North (1981) correctly perceived the necessity of broadening the
arguments in the utility function to explain the functions of ideology.
However, because of his reluctance to accept fully Stigler and Becker's
(1977) reformulation of the utility function, he is a step short of
constructing a positive theory of ideology. In his formulation,
individuals must act nonrationally when ideologies are involved. For
example, he states that "any successful ideology must overcome the free
rider problem, Its fundamental aim is to energize groups to behave
contrary to a simple, hedonic, individual calculus of costs and benefits"
(North, 1981, p. 53). He makes this position even more explicit in his
review of Olson's new book: "People frequently act through conviction
about the legitimacy or fairness of the set of rules of the game that
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surrounds them. That is, if people are convinced the rules are fair, they
may obey them even when at times they could be better off not obeying
them" (North, 1983, p. 164). However, as maintained by Becker (1976, pp.
7-8), "the economic approach does not draw conceptual distinctions
between major and minor decisions, ... ; or between decisions said to
involve strong emotions and those with little emotional involvement,
; or between decisions by persons with different incomes, education, or
family backgrounds." Then how will a rational individual be a simple
hedonic, individual calculus of costs and benefits when ideological
consideration is not involved but abstain from doing so when this
consideration is present?
l7rt should be clear that large interest groups, cooperations, and
bureaus will also invest in ideological education to convince their
members of their legitimacy. The analysis of ideology should be readily
applicable to the other informal institutions, such as ethical codes,
mores, and customs.
18 This point has long been recognized by sociologists. For example,
Eisenstadt (1968, p. 412) notes that "the analysis of any concrete
institutional pattern has to start from the existence of institutional
arrangements as inherent in the very nature of human society." However,
economists tend to ignore it, except for the institutional school
economists.
19 This point is succinctly expressed by T. N. Srinivasan in his
comments on a paper by Lord Bauer about the relative efficiencies of
markets compared with those of planning: "A fuller understanding of their
systemic role in concrete sociopolitical-economic contexts is essential
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in devising development policies. In the absence of such understanding, a
discussion of the place of markets or, for that matter, central planning
cannot go very much beyond assigning totemic value to either"
(Srinivasan, 1984, p. 55).
20 The terms "institutional change" and "institutional innovation"
are used interchangeably in this paper because a modification of an
existing arrangement is also an innovative activity, and the adoption of
a newly innovated arrangement must change the original one.
21Although, in the very long run, the institutional arrangements and
structure in any society may converge, in the short run, the most
efficient institutional arrangements will be different in different
societies due to the difference in socio-political histories. It is a
pity that many journalists and politicians fail to see this point and use
the institutional arrangements in their own countries to judge the
institutional arrangements in other societies.
22 It is worth noting that my definition of the institutional
structure includes both production relations and the superstructure in
Marxian terminology. Since both the production relations and
superstructure are conditioned by the technology, my analysis is
consistent with Marx's view. However, there is one distinction here.
Marx's statement mainly refers to the change in the whole institutional
structure, that is, the dramatic change from the primitive to the feudal,
from the feudal to the capitalist system. My analysis is restricted to
the changes of particular institutional arrangements, taking other
arrangements in the structure as given.
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23 since the right to ownership is an exclusive right that is limited
only by those restrictions that are imposed by the state, the change in
the contents of property rights will necessarily involve government
intervention. Therefore, a theory of the state is also required to
explain the change in property rights.
24 In Lewis's words, "Change begins at some spot in the web of
beliefs and relationships, and spreads outward from there" (Lewis, 1955,
p. 144).
25 The change from the hunusan contract to the gama contract in the
Hayami and Kikuchi study (1981), which was mentioned before, exemplifies
this point. The actual wage is reduced in the gama contract. However, it
is the gama arrangement, not a free labor market, that is adopted because
the gama contract appears legitimate to villagers in terms of traditional
moral principles of mutual help and income sharing in the village.
26 some institutional innovations are purely motivated by the purpose
of redistributing the existing social income. In addition to some
individuals losing, the society as a whole may also lose because the
innovation is a resource-consuming process. However, such an innovation
will not be a voluntary process. It is in general imposed by the
government. The discussion of this type of change will be discussed in
the next section.
27 Forcing people to abandon their traditional beliefs, values,
attitudes, mores, and modes of living may cause much unrest. As Bauer
notes, "Governments of developing countries have in fact rarely attempted
such enforced transformations. They generally recognize that attempts of
this kind would invite strong resistance, possibly revolt. Even
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substantial moves in such a direction, or suspicions that such attempts
will be made, can elicit violent responses, as indeed has often happened
in Asia and Africa." (Bauer, p. 31).
28weber's definition of the state is quoted in Frohlich and
Oppenheiner (1974).
29Quoted by Fields (1981, p. 186).
30As noted by Dahl and Charles (1953, p. 42), "Whoever controls
government usually has the 'last word' on a question; whoever controls
government can enforce decisions on other organization in the area"
(quoted by Downs, 1957, p. 22). The constraints that are put on the
absolute power of the ruler definitely differ from society to society,
largely conditioned on their past histories; however, even a popularly
elected president or prime minister has a large degree of freedom in
pursuing his own goals because of the length between election periods and
so on (Breton, 1974).
31 That is, as the wealth of the ruler increase, the marginal utility
of the wealth declines and the marginal utilities of other commodities,
such as prestige, position in history, and so on, increase. Therefore,
the ruler will substitute away from pursuing the enlargement of wealth to
pursue the prestige and other commodities.
32 This paragraph is quoted from Srinivasan (1984, p. 53). Srinivasan
in turn quotes it from Jagdish Bhagwati, "Development Economics: What
Have We Learned?" Distinguished Speakers Lecture, Manila, Asian
Development Bank, October 1983.
33 For many other examples, see Bauer, 1984; Bauer and Yamey, 1957;
Schultz, 1964; and Lewis, 1955.
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34A similar view is also expressed by North (1981, p. 20), "The
existence of a state is essential for economic growth; the state,
however, is the source of man-made economic decline."
35 The distinctions between two types of profit-seeking activities
are in order. The first type is so-called rent seeking (Krueger, 1974)
and directly unproductive profit seeking (Srinivasan, 1985). These
activities include tariff-seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, seeking of
revenues generated by given tariffs, premium seeking for given import
licenses, and so on. Once a government starts to intervene in trade or
other economic functions, individuals will engage in activities to
influence government policies in their favor. These activities promise
profits to those individuals engaging in them; however, these activities
use up resources, shrink the production possibility frontiers, and
produce no goods or services for the society as a whole. Such type of
profit seeking will result in stagnation instead of growth. The second
type is productive profit seeking, including investments in physical and
human capital, innovating new technology and efficient institutional
arrangements, and so on. These activities enlarge the production
possibility frontier and increase the supply of goods and services to the
society. The economic growth of a nation is impossible without such
profit seeking.
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